The Linguist

The Linguist 54,2

The Linguist is a languages magazine for professional linguists, translators, interpreters, language professionals, language teachers, trainers, students and academics with articles on translation, interpreting, business, government, technology

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thelinguist.uberflip.com APRIL/MAY The Linguist 9 FEATURES training of linguists. In many cases, linguists were not tested or given any training at all. Their military supervisors or 'customers' generally had little knowledge of how to manage or work effectively with linguists. This meant that the provision of language support was characterised by improvisation and confusion, and, as a result, was inconsistent, inefficient and of low quality. A new structure From 1998, NATO made moves to rationalise its language support in theatre. A Linguistic Services Branch was set up with a central office in Sarajevo but with responsibility for linguists in HQ elements throughout Bosnia and Croatia. It was headed by Louise Askew, a professional, English-native linguist, trained in the local languages and with experience of working in international organisations. The existing employees were tested to determine their capabilities and were placed in the most appropriate positions in the new structure. About a quarter proved to have inadequate skills and had their contracts terminated. Systems were put in place to ensure quality through rigorous testing, linguistic supervision and on-going training in interpretation and translation. Translations were revised by the most experienced translators, terminology was systematically recorded and disseminated, standards and rules for interpretation were applied, and so on. The aim was to bring the service up to a professional standard. NATO subsequently embarked on peace support operations in Kosovo (from 1999) and Afghanistan (from 2001), and encountered similar problems to those in Bosnia. The actions taken in Bosnia were used as a template for the reorganisation of linguistic services in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In some respects, the problems were of a greater magnitude in these latter operations, as it was more difficult to find professional linguists with the right language combinations to head the services (respectively Albanian and Serbian plus English; and Dari and Pashto plus English). Devastated infrastructure meant that the services faced more obvious technical and practical difficulties. Linguists often provide cultural mediation, but this was especially so in Afghanistan, where differences with the Western nations contributing troops to the NATO-led force were huge. In Afghanistan, war and lack of educational opportunities caused a severe shortage of even minimally-qualified linguists. A doctrine for change As a result of the problems encountered in these operations by not only NATO itself, but also the individual member nations, the alliance decided to draw up a doctrine in 2011 to lay down a considered and systematic approach to providing language support. As Head of the Linguistic Service at the time, I was tasked with leading the team that devised this doctrine, which is known as 'ALingP-1 – Linguistic Support for Operations'. 1 No such doctrine had existed before and it was intended to provide a blueprint for establishing effective language services for any future NATO operation. The doctrine reflects the lessons that were learned after 1996 and provides for a wide range of possible situations, from deployment in a war zone (such as Afghanistan) to the needs of a more stable, peacebuilding environment (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina). It covers both civilian and military linguists, and provides flexibility by allowing for different approaches arising from differing legal and other considerations. It is thus very detailed, with guidance on every aspect of linguistic support, ranging from how a service should be structured to the way in which a translation should be formatted. This level of detail is also necessary as the doctrine is aimed at staff officers and troops on the ground, and rightly assumes that they may have little knowledge of linguistic functions. One of the doctrine's more important recommendations is that there should be one body or structure controlling all aspects of language support at both central and local levels. This prevents the kind of piecemeal approach to language services seen in Bosnia. Similarly, it stresses the need for advance planning before an operation, so that the nations and command structure can decide such things as which language combinations are likely to be needed on the The provision of language support was characterised by improvisation and confusion CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION An Afghan National Interpreter and US Army Lieutenant talk with an Afghan boy during a patrol in the Zabul province of Afghanistan (left); and a US soldier, US Army Interpreter and Iraqi soldier look over a map in Mosul, Iraq (far left) US ARMY PHOTO BY STAFF SGT WILLIAMTREMBLAY, 29/6/10 VIA FLICKR (CC BY 2.0)

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